Computerworld Acknowledges AITP eVoting Position
Monday, November 27, 2006
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Posted by: Norbert Kubilus, CCP -- Chair, Legislative Affairs
October 30, 2006
E-Voting Believers
Electronic voting has been around for over a decade, and, yes, it continues to be haunted by concerns over security, accuracy and integrity. But Avi Rubin ["Q&A: Go Back to Paper Ballots, Says E-voting Expert", Computerworld.com, 09/20/2006] doesn't acknowledge that e-voting works very well in states like Nevada.
It's no coincidence that Nevada is leading the nation in e-voting. Nevada's regulation of the gaming industry, particularly slot machines, is stricter than federal and most state regulations for e-voting. In fact, when Nevada introduced its e-voting systems in 2004, the state Gaming Control Board's Electronic Services Division, which is responsible for verifying the security of electronic gambling machines, reviewed the system and declared it secure.
Rubin also doesn't seem to be aware that the Association for Information Technology Professionals adopted a nine-point recommendation for e-voting standards in 2004 based primarily on Nevada's gaming industry regulations, or that the AITP is leading other IT professional organizations in influencing federal and state e-voting standards.
The AITP's nine points are:
- Public access to the related software to permit independent inspection and confidence in its accuracy.
- Independent testing, including random spot checks, similar to existing Nevada provisions for slot machine testing
- Meticulous, constantly updated standards for machines
- Scrutiny of manufacturers to ensure their independence from parties and candidates
- An independent testing lab with an arm's-length relationship with the manufacturers it polices and that's open to inquiries from the public
- A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.Public access to the related software to permit independent inspection and confidence in its accuracy.
- Independent testing, including random spot checks, similar to existing Nevada provisions for slot machine testing
- Meticulous, constantly updated standards for machines
- Scrutiny of manufacturers to ensure their independence from parties and candidates
- An independent testing lab with an arm's-length relationship with the manufacturers it polices and that's open to inquiries from the public
- A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.Independent testing, including random spot checks, similar to existing Nevada provisions for slot machine testing
- Meticulous, constantly updated standards for machines
- Scrutiny of manufacturers to ensure their independence from parties and candidates
- An independent testing lab with an arm's-length relationship with the manufacturers it polices and that's open to inquiries from the public
- A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.Meticulous, constantly updated standards for machines
- Scrutiny of manufacturers to ensure their independence from parties and candidates
- An independent testing lab with an arm's-length relationship with the manufacturers it polices and that's open to inquiries from the public
- A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.Scrutiny of manufacturers to ensure their independence from parties and candidates
- An independent testing lab with an arm's-length relationship with the manufacturers it polices and that's open to inquiries from the public
- A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.An independent testing lab with an arm's-length relationship with the manufacturers it polices and that's open to inquiries from the public
- A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.A mechanism for immediate Election Day inspection of suspected defective machines
- A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.A mechanism for voter review of paper copies of ballots prior to casting a vote and preservation of those ballots for any required recounts
- An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.An alternative voting mechanism, such as early postal balloting, for those who refuse to trust the machines
- Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.Random but thorough Election Day parallel testing of voting machines.
Walking away from e-voting is not the answer. If states would incorporate these recommendations in their e-voting requirements, secure and reliable e-voting would be attainable.
Norbert J. Kubilus, CCP MBCS Chairman AITP Legislative Affairs Committee
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